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Abstract
The variation of a martingale p k 0 = p 0 , . . . , p k of probabilities on a finite (or countable) set X is denoted V (p k 0 ) and defined by V (p k 0 ) = E k t=1 p t − p t−1 1 . It is shown that V (p k 0 ) ≤ 2kH(p 0 ), where H(p) is the entropy function H(p) = − x p(x) log p(x) and log stands for the natural logarithm. Therefore, if d is the number of elements of X, then V (p k 0 ) ≤ √ 2k log d. It is shown that the order of magnitude of the bound √ 2k log d is tight for d ≤ 2 k : there is C > 0 such that for every k and d ≤ 2 k there is a martingale p k 0 = p 0 , . . . , p k of probabilities on a set X with d elements, and with variation V (p k 0 ) ≥ C √ 2k log d. An application of the first result to game theory is that the difference between v k and lim k v k , where v k is the value of the k-stage repeated game with incomplete information on one side with d states, is bounded by G 2k −1 log d (where G is the maximal absolute value of a stage payoff). Furthermore, it is shown that the order of magnitude of this game theory bound is tight.
Keywords:
Maximal martingale variation; posteriors variation; repeated games with incomplete information 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 60G42, Secondary 91A20
Introduction
Bounds on the variation of a martingale of probabilities are useful in the theory of repeated games with incomplete information. Such martingales arise as sequences of an uninformed player's posteriors p k 0 = p 0 , . . . , p k of an unknown game parameter. The martingale's variation, V (p k 0 ) := E k t=1 p t − p t−1 1 , bounds from above (a positive constant times) the payoff advantage that the more informed player has over the less informed one in a two-person zerosum k-stage repeated game with incomplete information on one side; see [1, 3, 4, 5] .
The maximal variation of a martingale p k 0 of probabilities over a finite set depends both on the initial probability p = p 0 , and on k. It is bounded by a positive constant C(p) times the square root of k. This inequality is used in Aumann and Maschler [1] 1 to prove that the speed of convergence of the minmax value v k of the k-repeated game with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring is O(1/ √ k). Zamir [5] proved the tightness of this bound: there is a repeated game with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring for which the error term, v k − lim v k , is greater than or equal to 1/ √ k. Mertens and Zamir [3] showed that C(p) is less than or equal to √ d − 1 , where d is the number of elements in the support of p, and the error term is less than or equal to
where G is the the maximal absolute value of a payoff in one of the possible d single-stage games.
The objective of the present paper is to improve the order of magnitude of the term √ d in the above-mentioned bounds. The main result of the paper is that
where H is the entropy function. This inequality implies that the error term is less than or equal to G 2H(p) / √ k , which is less than or equal to G √ 2 log d / √ k . We also provide tightness results for both the variation of a martingale of probabilities and the error term in repeated games with incomplete information on one side: there exists a positive constant C such that for all positive integers k and d with 1 < d ≤ 2 k there is (1) a martingale of prob-abilities on a finite set with d elements p k 0 : p 0 , . . . , p k with variation greater than C √ k log d , and (2) a repeated game with incomplete information on one side with an error term that is greater than C G √ log d / √ k .
The results
Let X be a finite (or countable) set. For x ∈ X, the x-th coordinate of an element q ∈ R X is denoted q(x), and ℓ 1 (X) is the (Banach) space of all elements q ∈ R X with x∈X |q(x)| < ∞. Obviously, if X is a finite set, then ℓ 1 (X) equals R X . The ℓ 1 norm of q ∈ ℓ 1 (X) is q 1 := x∈X |q(x)|, and (thus) the ℓ 1 distance between two elements p, q ∈ ℓ 1 (X) is the sum p −
Let ∆(X) denote all probabilities on X, i.e., all elements p ∈ R X + with x∈X p(x) = 1, and for p ∈ ∆(X) and a positive integer k we denote by M k (X, p) the set of all martingales p k 0 with p t ∈ ∆(X) and p 0 = p.
The variation of the martingale p
and
A trivial inequality is V (k, p) ≤ 2k. A classical bound (that is used in the theory of repeated games with incomplete information; see [1, 3] 
This classical bound improves the trivial bound only for d ≤ 4k. Our objective is to derive a meaningful bound that (1) is applicable also to d > 4k, and (2) such that its order of magnitude is the best possible one for large d. We have
and thus
where
is the entropy function and log stands for the natural logarithm. Theorem 2 There is a positive constant C > 0 such that for every k and d
Bounds of the variation of martingales of probabilities are useful in the study of repeated games with incomplete information [1] . In a two-person zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information on one side (henceforth, RGII-OS) the players play repeatedly the same stage game G. However, the game depends on a state x ∈ X known only to player 1 (P1) and x is chosen according to a probability p ∈ ∆(X) that is commonly known. In the course of the game player 2 (P2) may learn information about x only from past actions of player 1.
Formally, a RGII-OS Γ is defined by a state space X, a probability p ∈ ∆(X), finite sets of stage actions, I for P1 and J for P2, and for every x ∈ X we have a two-person zero-sum I × J matrix game G x . We write Γ = X, p, I, J, G , where G stands for the list of matrix games (G x ) x∈X .
2 I wish to thank Benjamin Weiss for raising the question of the tightness of the factor √ log d in the bound, and demonstrating for each positive ℓ the existence of a simple martingale of probabilities p ℓ 0 on a set with 2 ℓ elements and with variation ℓ. Specifically, starting with the uniform probability, in each stage half of the non-zero probabilities (each half equally likely) move to zero, and the other half double their probabilities. Therefore, for each fixed α > 0 there is a positive constant 0 < C(α) (→ α→0+ 0) such that for k and d with α ≤
, is the payoff from P2 to P1 when in state x the players play the action pair (i, j).
The k-stage repeated game, denoted Γ k (p), or Γ k for short, is played as follows. Nature chooses x ∈ X according to the probability p. P1 is informed of nature's choice x, but P2 is not. At stage 1 ≤ t ≤ k, P1 chooses i t ∈ I and simultaneously P2 chooses j t ∈ J (and these choices are observed by the players following the play in stage t). The choice of i t may depend on x, i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i t−1 , j t−1 (which is the information of P1 before the play at stage t) and the choice of j t may depend on i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i t−1 , j t−1 (which is the information of P2 before the play at stage t).
A pair of strategies σ of P1 and τ of P2 (together with the initial probability p) define a probability distribution P p σ,τ , or P σ,τ for short, on the space of plays x, i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i k , j k , and thus on the stream of payoffs g t := G x it,jt . The (normalized) payoff of the k-stage repeated game is the average of the payoffs in the k-stages of the game, namely,
, where E σ,τ stands for the expectation with respect to the probability P p σ,τ , the maximum is over all mixed (or behavioral) strategies σ of P1, and the minimum is over all mixed (or behavioral) strategies τ of P2.
For fixed components X, I, J, G , the minmax value of the matrix game
x is a function of q ∈ ∆(X) and is denoted u(q). The least concave function on ∆(X) that is greater than or equal to u ("smallest concave majorant") is denoted cav u. Aumann and Maschler [1] proved that v k (p) ≥ (cav u) (p) and that v k (p) converges to (cav u) (p) as k → ∞ . Moreover, [1] shows that the bound of the variation of the martingale of probabilities bounds the (nonnegative) difference
Inequality (3) yields on the one hand a rate of convergence of v k (p), and on the other hand enables us to approximate the value v k (p) for a specific k and a specific game. The classical bound of V (k, p) that is used in [1, 3] and in subsequent works is
For d > k this bound is not useful. Theorem 1 provides an effective bound when d is subexponential in k, namely, when log d = o(k), or, more generally, when H(p)/k is small. Applying the bound in Theorem 1 to the inequality (3) implies that
One may wonder if the order of magnitude of the bound in (4) 
3 Proofs such that E(p t | H * t ) − p t ≤ ε/k, and replaces p t withp t := E(p t | H *
In that case we can assume that: (1) P is a probability on the product X × (× k t=0 A t ), where A t are finite sets (e.g., the atoms of the algebra H t ); (2) (x, a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k ) is a vector of random variables having distribution P ; and (3) p t is the conditional distribution of x given a 0 , . . . , a t . Let P t be the conditional (joint) distribution of (x, a t ) given (a 0 , . . . , a t−1 ), P tX its marginal on X, and P tAt its marginal on A t . Let P tX ⊗ P tAt denote the product distribution on X × A t , i.e., P tX ⊗ P tAt (x, a t ) = P tX (x)P tAt (a t ). By Pinsker's inequality (see, e.g., [2, p. 300]), we have
where for two probabilities P and Q on a finite (or countable) set Y , P − Q = y |P (y) − Q(y)| and D(P Q) = y∈Y P (y) log
(where log denotes the natural logarithm and 0 log 0 = 0).
Let H Pt (x) := − x P t (x) log P t (x), H Pt (a t ), and H Pt (x, a t ), denote the entropy of the random variables x, a t , and (x, a t ), where (x, a t ) has distribution P t , and H Pt (x | a t ) := H Pt (x, a t ) − H Pt (a t ). A straightforward computation yields D(P t P tX ⊗ P tAt ) = H Pt (x) − H Pt (x | a t ). Therefore,
Note that P t is a random variable, which is a function of a 0 , . . . , a t−1 , and therefore, by the properties of conditional entropy, E P H Pt (x) = H P (x | a 0 , . . . , a t−1 ) (where E P denotes the expectation with respect to the probability distribution P ) and E P H Pt (x | a t ) = H P (x | a 0 , . . . , a t−1 , a t ). Therefore,
As the square root is a concave function we have, by Jensen's inequality,
As
x |P t (x, a) − P tAt (a)P tX (x)| = P t − P tX ⊗ P tAt , we deduce that E P p t − p t−1 = E P P t − P tX ⊗ P tAt and therefore by substituting E P p t − p t−1 for E P P t − P tX ⊗ P tAt we get
As the square root is a concave function, using Jensen's inequality and the equality and inequality
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. Note that V (k, d) is monotonic increasing in d and k, and there is a positive constant
0 are two martingales with total variation V 1 and V 2 , respectively, then p 0 ⊗ q 0 , . . . , p k 1 ⊗ q 0 is a martingale with total variation V 1 and p k 1 ⊗ q 0 , p k 1 ⊗ q 1 , . . . , p k 1 ⊗ q k 2 is a martingale with total variation V 2 and therefore p 0 ⊗ q 0 , . . . , p k 1 ⊗ q 0 , p k 1 ⊗ q 1 , . . . , p k 1 ⊗ q k 2 is a martingale with total variation V 1 + V 2 . Therefore,
from which it follows that
Inequality (8) implies that if k is a multiple of ℓ we have
is the largest integer ≤ x), and therefore
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. Given two repeated games with incomplete information on one side,
. A possible helpful interpretation of Γ is that nature chooses a pair x 1 ∈ X 1 and x 2 ∈ X 2 , equivalently a pair of games G x 1 and G x 2 , according to the product probability p 1 ⊗ p 2 . P1 is informed of the choice (G x 1 , G x 2 ) of nature, but P2 is not. In each stage of the repeated game, both players select strategies for the first and for the second game, and P1 chooses in addition which one of the two games determines the stage payoff.
As a function of i = (i 1 , i 2 , b), for each fixed b = 1, 2, the payoff function G 
Indeed, P1 can play b t = 1 in stages t = 1, . . . , k 1 and b t = 2 in stages t = k 1 + 1, . . . , k 1 + k 2 , and the first coordinates i
For ℓ > 2 and a sequence
Note 
and therefore if k is a multiple of ℓ we can take k b = k/ℓ and therefore 
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Remarks
4.1 Comments on the proof of Theorem 1.
Our proof of Theorem 1 relies on Pinsker's inequality, and it uses informationtheoretic tools. In fact, the information-theoretic intuition has led us to the result and its proof. However, readers unfamiliar with the informationtheoretic concepts may find the proof obscure. The following is an alternative derivation (which disguises the use of the information-theoretic techniques) and uses classical martingale theory techniques. First, note that Pinsker's inequality implies that if Z and Y are two nonnegative random variables with
Inequality (9), which is equivalent to Pinsker's inequality, can obviously be proved directly. 3 The continuation of the proof avoids the (explicit) use of information-theoretic techniques.
It follows from (9) that if Z 0 , . . . , Z k is a martingale of nonnegative random variables, then
which by Jensen's inequality, the concavity of the square root, and the telescopic feature of the series EZ t log Z t − EZ t−1 log Z t−1 , is
Therefore, if p 0 , . . . , p k is a martingale with values in R X + we have
By the Schwartz inequality we obtain that
, then by the convexity of q log q we have Ep k (x) log p k (x) ≤ Ep 0 (x) log M(x), and then
We conclude that if x p 0 (x) = 1, then
The variation of a martingale of probabilities over a countable set.
It is of interest to find a necessary and sufficient condition for a distribution p on a countable set X for sup k
We remark here on the sufficient conditions derived from the classical method and our method of bounding the variation of martingales of probabilities.
The classical bound of the variation of a martingale p k 0 is obtained by bounding, for each fixed x ∈ X, the expectation variation E y(x) 1 , where
, and summing over all x ∈ X. Assuming without loss of generality that p 0 is a constant p ∈ ∆(X), we have (by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality) y(x) 1 ≤ √ k y(x) 2 , and, therefore, by Jensen's inequality, E y(x) 1 ≤ √ k E y(x) 2 2 , which by the martingale property is ≤ √ k E((p k (x)) 2 − (p 0 (x)) 2 ) ≤ √ k E((p k (x)) − (p 0 (x)) 2 ) = √ k p 0 (x) − (p 0 (x)) 2 . Therefore, if p ∈ ∆(X) and X is countable, the classical method yields that sup k 1 √ k V (k, p) < ∞ whenever x p(x) < ∞. As −q log q = o( √ q) as q → 0+, the condition x p(x) < ∞ implies that H(p) = − x p(x) log p(x) < ∞. Obviously, there are probabilities p over a countable set X such that H(p) < ∞ but x p(x) = ∞. Therefore our bound provides a strictly sharper sufficient condition, H(p) < ∞, for sup k 1 √ k V (k, p) < ∞, compared to the one derived by using the classical method.
The asymptotic behavior of V (k, d).
The asymptotic behavior of V (k, d) deserves further study. [4] proves that V (k, 2)/ √ k converges as k → ∞ to 
